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Abstract 
Neuroeconomics illustrates our deepening descent into the details of individual cognition. 
This descent is guided by the implicit assumption that “individual human” is the 
important “agent” of neoclassical economics. I argue here that this assumption is neither 
obviously correct, nor of primary importance to human economies. In particular I suggest 
that the main genius of the human species lies with its ability to distribute cognition 
across individuals, and to incrementally accumulate physical and social cognitive 
artifacts that largely obviate the innate biological limitations of individuals. If this is 
largely why our economies grow, then we should be much more interested in distributed 
cognition in human groups, and correspondingly less interested in individual cognition. 
We should also be much more interested in the cultural accumulation of cognitive 
artifacts: computational devices and media, social structures and economic institutions.  
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 Experimental and behavioral economics and, by association, neuroeconomics 
overwhelmingly involve this kind of experiment: Simple choices for individuals to make, 
perhaps in the context of a simple social interaction such as a two-person game. 
Importantly, each subject’s access to other subjects is tightly circumscribed. In individual 
choice experiments, such access is simply forbidden for statistical reasons, and in game 
experiments it is closely regulated for both game-theoretic and statistical reasons. The 
hunch seems to be (1) that individual minds are the centrally important information-
processing units of economic science, and (2) that simple decision problems and simple 
games usefully characterize the actual decision problems and actual games that govern 
the important economic phenomena, such as growth and inequality. For example, 
McCabe (2008, this volume) singles out trust and reciprocity as enablers of economic 
growth, and perhaps they are. We are invited to view experiments about simple trust 
games between two individuals (and what happens within the individual skulls involved 
in such games) as crucially relevant to economic growth.   
 Let me illustrate an alternative hunch. I rather suspect that economic growth is 
overwhelmingly due to the cultural accumulation of external cognitive artifacts, 
including social distributions of information processing, which implement external 
information representations and algorithms. This accumulation increasingly exploits the 
performance strengths of individual cognition (e.g. hand-eye coordination, fast pattern 
recognition) and increasingly avoids its weaknesses (e.g. algebra, emotional 
interference). It increasingly distributes information processing across group members in 
highly structured ways, aided by external cognitive artifacts, and lessens the importance 
of individual brains to economically important information-processing tasks. I also 
suspect this accumulation is not mostly the product of individual learning, but is rather 
mostly the product of social learning processes that operate across contemporaneous 
social space and (especially) across generations of social groups confronting related 
tasks. This story of economic growth is of the increasing marginality of individual brains 
and the growing centrality of socially distributed cognition. I think this is a plausible 
alternative hunch about cognitive science’s primary relevance to economic growth. 
 I will call the viewpoint I am criticizing “cognitive individualism.” It powerfully 
shapes and constrains theory, research questions and empirical inquiry. Importantly for 
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this volume, it unsurprisingly draws researchers and resources ever deeper into the study 
of individual cognition. In an intellectual milieu guided by cognitive individualism, the 
emergence of neuroeconomics (and the strong support it gets from many distinguished 
scholars) was inevitable. To be clear, neuroeconomics is not my target here; it is just one 
particularly vivid manifestation of my true target. 
 I suspect that many decision and discovery processes that govern the most important 
economic phenomena involve a high degree of social and/or computational complexity. 
This is notoriously true of many dynamic decision problems and their solution 
algorithms: I suspect that a substantial part of inequality is due to differential success 
(across dynastic families) at intergenerational innovation and transmission of good 
heuristics for dealing with life-cycle decisions. Related considerations apply to 
technological progress and hence growth. I simply don’t believe I have this nifty laptop 
or this swell alphabet merely (or even mostly) because of individual cognitive solutions to 
simple tasks or games. Rich, external cognitive artifacts like these were accumulated by 
increment and innovation across years and indeed millennia. I suspect the information-
processing units responsible for these increments and innovations were usually groups of 
people and rarely individual brains (notwithstanding our seeming need to render 
scientific and technological history in terms of individual heroes). That is, I suspect our 
accumulation of cognitive artifacts (that transform our tasks and shape distributed 
cognition) is overwhelmingly the product of social learning processes. And so I suspect 
that most of the experimental and theoretical work on individual learning, with or without 
brain scans, has limited relevance to this accumulated cognition, and hence limited 
relevance to economic growth. Or at least, so goes an alternative hunch. 
 To put some formal structure on this alternative hunch, I begin by (tentatively) 
viewing the relationship between neoclassical economics and cognitive science from the 
perspective of Marr (1982). Marr divides understanding of an information processor into 
three levels. At the top level, we have a rational model of a processor—a description of 
what a processor ought to compute, and an argument as to why it should compute that. 
Marr calls this the “computational theory” or CT of the processor. Addition is a CT of a 
cash register; a Nash equilibrium strategy is a CT of a game player (given certain well-
known assumptions about other players); and so on. The next level of understanding is 
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“algorithm and representation” or A&R. Here we find representations of inputs and 
outputs, and the algorithms that convert the former into the latter, such that the output 
approximates the CT’s specified output in some satisfactory way—robustly, efficiently, 
accurately or with some tradeoff amongst these. Usually, a great variety of A&Rs can 
approximate the specified output of any CT. We might (with some abuse) call the A&R 
“software.” Finally there is the bottom level of “physical implementation” or PI: What’s 
the actual physical “machine” or “hardware” in which the A&R will “run?” Vacuum 
tubes, silicon, neurons or Tinker Toys?—Again, many PIs can “run” any given A&R. 
 From a Marrian perspective, neoclassical economics is CT without any specification 
of A&R or PI: It is the hunch that the outputs specified by decision and game theory—the 
neoclassical CTs—are, to an empirically fruitful approximation, the observed behavior of 
economic processors under almost all conditions.1 Marr thought that CT was centrally 
important for understanding processors, and some philosophers such as Dennett (1987) 
seem sympathetic to that view (with caveats). This is why the title of Gul and 
Pesendorfer’s (2008) spirited defense of neoclassical economics, “The Case for Mindless 
Economics,” makes me wince. That title just invites distracting name-calling like 
“behaviorist” and “Skinnerian” for no good reason. With a title like “The Case for 
Algorithm-, Representation- and Machine-Free Economics,” Gul and Pesendorfer would 
pretend to know and care about cognitive science in a respectable Marrian sense. 
 Marr’s three-level view puts neuroeconomics in danger of appearing a sideshow 
about PI (hardware) which, in Marr’s view, is frequently a distraction from the really 
important issues that largely revolve around an A&R’s performance relative to CT’s 
specifications. Philosophically, the notion of “multiple realizability” of the mental in the 
physical also suggests that hardware is a distraction: The important essence of the mental 
may not be usefully reduced to any particular machine (Fodor 1975; Putnam 1988). 
McCabe’s quick and early attempt to dismiss the software/hardware question attests to 
                                                 
1
 Marr considered situations where “constraints” (within a CT’s “why argument”) define a unique desired 
mapping between inputs and outputs. Marr’s “constraints” conceptually correspond to decision-theoretic 
axioms: Both show that a certain desired mapping between input and output exists (while saying nothing 
about how that might be computed) and has certain properties. But decision theoretic axioms are typically 
weaker: They do not define a unique mapping (e.g. risk attitude and/or belief diversity within the structure 
of subjective expected utility or SEU). We might therefore wish to distinguish between strong CTs (like 
Marr’s example of stereopsis) and weaker CTs (such as SEU). The typically weaker form of economic CTs 
is a nontrivial complication of a Marrian view of neoclassical theory.  
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the danger. Neuroeconomics answers: We accept Marr’s distinctions and views in 
general, but we suspect that the individual human nervous system PI is in fact an 
especially strong constraint on the kinds of A&R that will “run” in it. Some 
neuroscientists go even further, arguing to dispense with CT and dissolve the distinction 
between A&R and PI in their special case: They say that while it is a cogent distinction in 
general, it is practically useless in the case of biological nervous systems. This line of 
thinking has its own philosophical heroes (e.g. Churchland 1981), and usually goes along 
with some stories about evolution (McCabe hints at these without development).  
 Not all neuroeconomists want to dispense with CT: For instance, Glimcher (2003) 
seems quite sympathetic with Marr’s view that rigorous cognitive science cannot proceed 
without a relevant CT. Philosophers such as Fodor (2000) have attacked both the notion 
that biological hardware is crucially special, and the relevance of adaptationist stories 
concerning that hardware’s structure. I find evolutionary talk inherently seductive, but I 
try to keep Gould and Lewontin (1979) in mind when considering ex post just-so stories 
about “adaptations.” Yet in spite of these difficulties, I’ll grant neuroeconomists the 
specialness of the biological hardware. It matters little to my subsequent argument. 
 Since introducing Marr above, I’ve said nothing explicit about which processor is the 
centrally important processor of economic science—what we call an agent at the level of 
economic CTs. Fudenberg and Levine’s (2006) “dual self” model of impatience and 
small-stakes risk aversion is just a recent example of theoretical fission of individuals 
into multiple noncooperative agents, a move endorsed by some philosophers (Ross 2005). 
Fissions of the agency of firms (into managers versus owners) and households (into 
spouse versus spouse) similarly create new noncooperative games between new smaller 
agents—an older and well-established move, as Camerer (2008) points out. What all of 
these moves have in common is fission of agency. Might it also be useful to explore some 
fusions of agency? 
 Edwin Hutchins is a cognitive anthropologist known to some as the “father of modern 
cognitive ethnography,” and a contemporary developer of theories of socially distributed 
cognition. Hutchins enormously influenced philosophers of mind such as Clark (1997). In 
his book Cognition in the Wild, Hutchins (1995) argues that the founding metaphor of 
cognitive psychology—that individual cognition is like a computer—was always flawed. 
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Hutchins instead suggests that it is socio-cultural symbol manipulation systems 
(cognition distributed across groups of humans, in interaction with external cognitive 
artifacts and both natural and artificial environments) that are really like a computer.  
 Hutchins (1995, p. 50) begins gently and craftily, pointing out that “Marr intended his 
framework to be applied to the cognitive processes that take place inside an individual, 
but there is no reason, in principle, to confine it to such a narrow conception of 
cognition.” To elaborate “Hutchins’ hunch,” individual brains are not the machines that 
matter the most in social science. The important machines of social science are social 
groups with special artifacts, communicating with one another both now and across time 
and even across generational time. In these larger machines, individual brains are not the 
machines of interest: Instead, individuals (brain and body) are just one type of cog in 
larger socially distributed cognitive machines. We might think of the usual path of 
cognitive-cultural history (and economic growth) as the successive accumulation and 
modification of external cognitive artifacts: external representations of information, 
external physical devices and external patterns of information flow and aggregation. 
These are to some extent social A&R, but also additional types of cogs in larger socially 
distributed machines. Cognitive-cultural change may tend to (1) increasingly exploit 
strengths of human cogs and avoid their weaknesses, (2) make human cogs 
interchangeable and redundant where possible, and (3) increase the robustness of the 
bigger social machines to their errors, weaknesses, and arrivals and departures. 
 Now let us return to the neuroeconomists’ attempted dismissal of the Marrian 
suspicion that hardware is a sideshow. From the viewpoint of Hutchins’ hunch, I answer: 
While I sympathize with your desire to know a source of the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of one part (the brain) of the human cogs, this knowledge might not be very 
important for explaining (say) economic growth, or wealth, poverty and inequality. You 
are looking at just one part (brain, not body) of what may be a relatively inconsequential 
cog. Put differently, you may be mistaken about what the most important processor is, 
how flexible it is, and how biologically determined it is. In recounting the evolution of 
Western navigation artifacts, Hutchins (1995, pp. 155) notes that  
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“…the existence of such a wide variety of specialized tools and techniques is 
evidence of a good deal of cultural elaboration directed toward avoiding algebraic 
reasoning and arithmetic…The kinds of cognitive tasks that people face in the wild 
cannot be inferred from the [CT of navigation] alone. The specific implementations 
of the task determine the kinds of cognitive processes that the performer will have to 
organize in order to do the task. The implementations are, in turn, part of a cultural 
process that tends to collect [external artifacts embodying specialized A&R] that 
permit tasks to be performed by means of simple cognitive processes.” 
 
To Hutchins, social hardware (in the form of both human cogs and external cognitive 
artifacts) does matter in the short run, but in the long run the hardware of distributed 
cognition isn’t even given: It is culturally evolved to sidestep limits of human cogs and 
exploit their strengths. Both the software and hardware of distributed cognition are, as 
Hutchins says, “artificial through and through.” Neural biology isn’t social cognitive 
destiny. 
 From the viewpoint of Hutchins’ hunch, doing rigorous Marrian cognitive science is 
overwhelmingly easier in social machines than in brains. I cannot put this better than 
Hutchins (1995, pp. 128-129): 
 
The basic computations of navigation could be characterized at the computational, 
representational/algorithmic, and implementational levels entirely in terms of 
observable representations. On this view of cognitive systems, communication 
among the actors is seen as a process internal to the cognitive system. Computational 
media, such as diagrams and charts, are seen as representations internal to the 
system, and the computations carried out upon them are more processes internal to 
the system. Because the cognitive activity is distributed across a social network, 
many of these internal processes and internal communications are directly 
observable. If a cognitive psychologist could get inside a human mind, he or she 
would want to look at the nature of the representations of knowledge, the nature and 
kind of communication among processes, and the organization of the information-
processing apparatus. We might imagine, in such a fantasy, that at some level of 
detail underlying processes (the mechanics of synaptic junctions, for instance) would 
still be obscured. But if we could directly examine the transformations of knowledge 
representations we might not care about the layers that remain invisible. Any 
cognitive psychologist would be happy enough to be able to look directly at the 
content of the cognitive system. With systems of socially distributed cognition we 
can step inside the cognitive system, and while some underlying processes (inside 
people’s heads) remain obscured, a great deal of the internal organization and 
operation of the system is directly observable. On this view, it might be possible to 
go quite far with a cognitive science that is neither mentalistic (remaining agnostic 
on the issue of representations “in the head”) nor behavioristic (remaining committed 
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to the analysis of information processing and the transformation of representations 
“inside the cognitive system”) [all emphasis in original]. 
 
Neuroscience does not “look directly at the content” of any information representation in 
any brain as concrete, observable, rich and obvious as a ship’s fix and projected bearing 
on a navigation chart, or a family’s current and projected asset position as represented in 
its own external financial accounts and plans. As near as I can make out, they haven’t yet 
agreed exactly where, or even how, the content of nouns like “ship” are physically 
represented in a brain (Martin and Caramazza 2003). Hutchins is, I think, still correct in 
spirit after thirteen years: What is still a fantastic voyage for neuroscience has long been 
feasible for social scientists examining distributed cognition systems. We can now (with 
the right ethnographic skills) literally step into these and directly observe just about every 
theoretically central entity of rigorous Marrian cognitive science. 
 For these reasons, I believe it may be fruitful to move away from studying what 
individuals do with simple decision problems and games, and toward studying distributed 
cognition in groups that confront complex problems and games. I now view my past 
work on social learning about hard economic problems (Ballinger, Palumbo and Wilcox 
2003) as my initial steps in that direction. Ballinger and I continue to study the evolution 
of advice (about hard economic problems) across generations of subjects. Advice is, after 
all, a relatively simple cultural-cognitive artifact, and one whose evolution we can follow 
over workable experimental timescales. Schotter and Sopher (2003) share similar 
interests with us.  
 Though it is rare relative to all work, some experimental economists have been 
contrasting the behavior of individuals and groups. So far, though, these groups are 
overwhelmingly either unstructured groups or “symmetric committees” in which all 
group members have equal access to information, cognitive artifacts and each other, and 
all have equal sway in decision making (e.g. majority or unanimity rule). This is not 
distributed cognition in Hutchins’ interesting sense (though such groups may be an 
interesting control treatment when studying distributed cognition, and such groups may 
have, on occasion, endogenously created their own truly distributed cognition). Most 
distributed cognition in real groups has asymmetric and hierarchical structural features 
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that divide tasks into subtasks, restrict data availability and information flows, and vest 
final decision making in only a subset of group members.2  
 Asymmetry and hierarchy are consequential features of distributed cognition. When 
viewed from the perspective of its place in distributed cognition, we discover that some 
shopworn normative failings of individual cognition may be social virtues in correctly 
structured groups. Hutchins (1995, p. 240) shows how “…some ways of organizing 
people around thinking tasks will lead to an exacerbation of the maladaptive aspects of 
[confirmation bias], whereas other forms of organization will actually make an adaptive 
virtue on the group level of what appears to be an individual vice.” Hutchins’ simulation 
studies of networks of individual interpreters suggest that it is just those social networks 
with lots of symmetric linkage of individuals (e.g. symmetric face-to-face committees) 
that would exacerbate confirmation bias. We might want to look closely at some real 
economic groups (e.g. extended families, parts of firms and/or public bureaucracies) to 
identify some typical structures of distributed economic cognition: Those might be good 
candidate structures for study. Symmetric committees are probably quite rare in 
distributed economic cognition—and with good reason, given Hutchins’ arguments. 
 Told that I could select only one tool from a neighboring discipline, it would be 
ethnography, not medical imaging. A simple and false choice, I hear you cry: It excludes 
a large middle of more complex alternatives you actually have, and also ignores a rich 
division of cognitive labor across researchers and disciplines. Fair enough. But if that cry 
was yours, then have some sympathy for individuals in typical experiments: They too are 
confronted with simple and false choices that exclude many middles (and extremes) 
they’d actually face in the field; and they too are sealed off from advisors, artifacts and 
other distributed cognitive resources they’d have in the field. The situated character of 
individual cognition in the field is one reason Harrison and List (2004) advocate more 
field experiments. Understanding situated individual cognition is almost definitionally 
crucial to understanding distributed cognition systems. But Hutchins’ hunch that the 
                                                 
2
 Cox and Hayne (2005) do have a small ex post asymmetry in groups that are bidding in common value 
auctions—group members with different signals of value; but all group members are still ex ante 
symmetric, and group members all seemed to immediately share their information with one another. I have 
in mind very different experiments, in which multiple types of information (and not simply multiple draws 
from a univariate distribution of a decision-relevant random variable) must be processed and then 
combined to reach a decision.   
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theoretical entities of classical cognitive psychology are better applied to distributed 
cognition than individual cognition is quite a bit beyond that.  
 I’m well aware that the ideas set out above will raise many hackles. To spare others 
the effort, I’ll hurl the epithet “group selectionist” at myself, since I seem to advocate the 
fusion of individual persons into a larger agent. I’ll also admit that I’m personally not all 
that interested in dealing with “crucial foundational problems” about groups. For 
instance, subjects seem to effortlessly overcome the pull of many bad equilibria when 
they can talk, observe and gossip the way they actually do in the real world (Duffy and 
Feltovich 2006). Yes, it is an interesting question why that is so: I hope for good answers 
and look forward to reading them with deep interest. No, the serious study of distributed 
economic cognition does not need to, and should not, wait for good answers to that 
question. So don’t bug me with the predictable question: “But what about the (insert 
favorite game-theoretic puzzle) problem you are obviously ignoring in this group?” One 
person’s—even one paper’s—foundational problem is another’s distracting detail. 
 More seriously and sympathetically: Economic theorists have already added 
important insights to a full understanding of distributed cognition, and I hope this 
continues. By now it is banal that economic institutions are important external cognitive 
artifacts that mediate specific kinds of distributed cognition at many scales: Philosophers 
of mind such as Clark (1997) are now getting this. At the smallest scales, within groups, 
smooth distributed cognition might very well be aided and abetted by specifically 
economic institutional gizmos that help solve problems of coordination, shirking, trust 
and so forth. Yes, of course—good thinking. But distributed cognition is not merely the 
solution of those economic problems: Solving them is no guarantee that distributed 
cognitive systems will increment and innovate their own hardware and software so as to 
grow an economy. More generally, distributed cognition systems, and economic 
mechanisms, are almost necessarily interdependent. I view neoclassical economic theory 
as a necessary part of a complete and rigorous cognitive science but, unlike Gul and 
Pesendorfer (2008), I think neoclassical economic theory just doesn’t address certain 
important economic issues—genuinely cognitive ones below the level of computational 
theory. And I’m beginning to doubt that the most important kinds of economic cognition 
occur solely in machines that only reveal their secrets to medical devices. That is a 
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criticism of our general obsession with individual cognition, and neuroeconomics is just 
one manifestation of that. 
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